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RETURNS TO TENURE OR SENIORITY?∗
I. Sebastian Buhai, Miguel A. Portela, Coen N. Teulings and Aico
van Vuuren
This study documents two empirical facts using matched employ-
er-employee data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are
hired last, are the first to leave the firm. Second, workers’ wages rise
with seniority, where seniority is defined as a worker’s tenure relative
to the tenure of his colleagues. Controlling for tenure, the probability
of a worker leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in
expected seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative du-
ration dependence of the separation hazard. Conditional on ten years of
tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th percentiles
of the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and
2.3-3.4 in Portugal.
Keywords: Wage Dynamics, Tenure, Seniority, Last-In-First-Out.
1. INTRODUCTION
Why does Lars earn less than Jens, if they have the same ability and work for the same
firm? And why is Pedro fired, but his equally productive colleague Miguel allowed to stay,
when their employer has to scale down employment? Some might think the answer to
both questions is obvious: it is because Jens and Miguel have greater seniority than
respectively Lars and Pedro; that is, Jens and Miguel have a longer tenure at their firms
than their respective co-workers Lars and Pedro. This paper provides empirical evidence
that supports these popular convictions. Using longitudinal linked worker-firm data for
Denmark and Portugal, we show that a worker who is hired last is likely to be fired first
(Last In, First Out; LIFO henceforth). Furthermore, we show that there is a return to
seniority in wages, where seniority is defined as the worker’s tenure relative to the tenure
of all his co-workers. The worker’s seniority is thus his rank in the tenure hierarchy of his
firm. When we claim that seniority affects a worker’s risk of job separation, we mean that
in addition to the negative effect of tenure on the hazard rate (i.e., the negative duration
dependence), being a senior worker with many more junior colleagues has a further
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negative effect on a worker’s separation rate. Similarly, when we claim that seniority
impacts a worker’s wage, we mean that on top of the return to tenure, there is a further
wage return to seniority. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to document
the existence of a return to seniority in wages.
Why would firms and workers agree on applying a LIFO layoff rule, and why would that
lead to a wage return to seniority? Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) develop
a framework that can rationalize these phenomena. Consider the standard monopoly
union/right-to-manage model, where the union bargains for a wage rate above the mar-
ket wage and where the firm decides on employment, taking this wage rate as given.
Employment will be set below the efficient level. This outcome implies that gains from
trade between the union and the firm are left unexploited, since the firm would be will-
ing to hire additional workers for a wage between the market wage and the wage rate
negotiated by the union. Kuhn and Robert show that the firm and the union can achieve
a Pareto superior outcome by agreeing on a hiring order based on seniority, and a wage
schedule increasing in seniority. This agreement would require the firm to hire workers
in a particular order: the most senior worker, with the highest wage rate, first. If the
wage schedule is properly set, the marginal worker hired by the firm receives exactly
the market wage, ensuring that employment is at its efficient level. The higher wage for
inframarginal senior workers allows these workers to capture part of the firm’s producer
surplus. Kuhn and Robert formalize these ideas in a static framework. The working ver-
sion of this paper, Buhai et al. (2009), develops a dynamic version of this model, akin to
Bentolila and Bertola (1990), and shows that the firm and its workers agree on a wage
profile where the workers hired first are fired last and earn higher wages. In this model,
firing is efficient, but hiring is less than first best due to a hold up problem. Bovenberg
and Teulings (2009) elaborate the implications of this model for the insurance of the
workers’ lifetime labor income.
Establishing a rate of return to seniority in wages is an exercise at the crossroads of
two topics extensively discussed in the literature on the earnings function: the return to
tenure, on the one hand (see, for example, Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991),
Altonji and Williams (2005), Dustmann and Meghir (2005), and Buchinsky et al. (2010)),
and the firm-size wage effect, on the other (see, for instance, Brown and Medoff (1989)).
Seniority is related to tenure, since a worker’s seniority is defined as his tenure relative to
the tenure distribution of the rest of the firm’s workforce. Hence, within a firm, seniority
is positively related to tenure by construction. Seniority is also related to firm size: an
increase in firm size will always increase the seniority of the firm’s incumbent workers,
since the newly hired workers have a lower tenure. It is therefore imperative in our exercise
to pin down what identifies the return to seniority above the return to tenure and the
firm-size wage effect. In related work, Neal (1995) and others have already shown that
the effect of a worker’s tenure at a given firm is partly a proxy for a return to industry or
occupation tenure. However, their finding does not affect our measurement of the return
to seniority within the firm.
The quest to estimate the wage return to tenure suffers from a well-known identification
problem: the within-job-spell variation in tenure is perfectly correlated with the within-
job-spell variation in experience. Hence, the first-order effects of experience and tenure
cannot be identified separately using solely within-spell variation. At the same time, the
between-job-spell variation is endogenous, since workers decide to change jobs at least
partly motivated by a comparison of their current wage to the wage in other jobs. Various
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strategies have been attempted to deal with this endogeneity problem. In line with this
literature, we apply the two methods most commonly used, namely that of Altonji and
Shakotko (who use job-spell fixed effects) and that of Topel (who uses within-spell first
differences). However, the identification problem troubling the estimation of the linear
term in the return to tenure does not affect the estimation of our object of interest, the
return to seniority. Unlike within-job-spell variation in tenure, within-job-spell variation
in seniority is not perfectly correlated with experience, since a worker’s seniority varies
with the hiring and firing of other workers. Hence, seniority is not a deterministic function
of tenure. This makes it possible to identify the return to seniority without resorting to
between-job-spell variation, and separately from the return to tenure.
Regarding the firm-size wage effect, a worker’s seniority is defined as the ratio of the
total number of workers in the firm (i.e. the firm size) and the number of co-workers
hired before himself (including himself). Therefore, the wage return to seniority can be
distinguished from the return to the firm size only due to the variation in the number of
more senior workers. Hence, in the extreme case where the LIFO rule applied perfectly,
the return to seniority would not be identified: the more senior workers would never
leave the firm before the respondent, such that all variation in the respondent’s seniority
would come from variation in firm size. Nevertheless, in practice, LIFO will not apply
to each and every separation. In particular, retirement– or any other types of exogenous
shocks such as leaving the firm because of a change in the spouse’s location, and so
forth– provides a source of variation in the number of workers with longer tenure. This
type of variation identifies therefore the return to seniority separately from the firm-size
wage effect.
We need exhaustive linked employer-employee data for establishing worker seniority,
as we must know the tenure rank of each worker, in all of the firms present in our
estimation sample. A full set of controls is added for the tenure in the estimation of the
separation rate. We find strong effects of seniority on the job exit hazard, such that the
expected increase in seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative duration
dependence of the hazard. Depending on the estimation method applied, we find small
but statistically highly significant returns to seniority in wages, in the order of magnitude
of 0.15 to 0.20% for every 10% increase in seniority for Portugal, and half that range for
Denmark. Conditional on ten years of tenure, going from the 10th to the 90th percentile
in the seniority distribution raises the wage level by 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark
and 2.3-3.4 percentage points in Portugal.
Apart from Kuhn and Robert (1989), relatively little attention has been given to
seniority-based promotions in the economic literature, even though it has been found
that many firms use seniority as at least one of the criteria for promotions (e.g., Lazear
and Oyer (2012)). At the same time, Waldman (2012) reports that wage changes are
usually discontinuous, similar to the predictions of tournament models such as Lazear and
Rosen (1981) or Malcomson (1984). This observation fits perfectly in a world envisioned
by Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989), where people move up in the hierarchy
because a more senior position has been vacated by a senior worker leaving the firm.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses our estimation strategy,
Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the estimation results, and Section 5
concludes.
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2. ESTIMATION STRATEGY
2.1. The LIFO separation rule
Define the rank qijt to be the number of workers in firm j with tenure greater than or
equal to tenure of worker i at time t, and define njt to be the total number of workers
in firm j at time t. Then, the seniority index log rijt is defined as
(1) log rijt ≡ log njt − log qijt.
Thus, the seniority index for the most senior worker is equal to the log firm size log njt,
while the seniority index of the least senior worker is zero.
There are two ways to analyze the effect of the LIFO separation rule on the process
of job separation. One approach is to investigate which workers are leaving the firm,
conditional on the event that some workers are leaving that firm. The LIFO hypothesis
then predicts that the workers with the shortest incomplete tenure have the highest
probability of separating. However, this implication does not discriminate between LIFO
and other hypotheses, as it merely confirms a standard result from the empirical literature
on job durations: namely, negative duration dependence in the separation hazard. For
this reason, we use a second approach: conditional on being employed by the firm, does
a worker’s separation rate depend on his seniority index, beyond and above the well-
documented effect of his tenure? If so, then we have clear evidence in favor of LIFO.
One might presume that the LIFO hypothesis is only relevant for layoffs, the separa-
tions initiated by employers. However, as argued by McLaughlin (1991), the distinction
between quits and layoffs is less clear-cut than one might think at first sight. In any
model with efficient bargaining, the worker and the firm will always be able to strike
a deal as long as there is positive surplus from continuation of the job, rendering the
distinction between quits and layoffs meaningless. This logic also applies in a world with
a LIFO rule. Knowing that the surplus has gone, either the firm might decide to lay off
the worker, or the worker might decide to quit and accept another job in expectation
for a future layoff. Hence, a LIFO rule will affect both quits and layoffs. We therefore do
not distinguish between the two.
We model the job separation process by a mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model
with discrete-time periods. The probability θijt of worker i leaving firm j, between years
t and t+ 1, conditional on Tijt years of elapsed tenure, is specified as
(2) θijt = Λ
(
γ0 log rijt + γ1∆ log njt + γ2Zij,t−Tijt + ψTijt + χj + vi
)
,
where Λ(·) is the logistic function and Zij,t−Tijt is a vector of observed characteristics of
the worker and the job at the moment of job start (e.g., education and experience at
the start of the job spell), and where vi represents the unobserved worker heterogeneity,
whereas χj represents firm heterogeneity. We include a full set of indicator variables
ψTijt , for every tenure category (years). Experience is included in the vector Zij,t−Tijt .
Identification of the coefficient γ0 of the seniority index log rijt, separately from the
parameters of the baseline hazard ψTijt , requires variation in log rijt that is independent
of the tenure Tijt. Such independent variation is available, since the seniority index also
depends on the hiring, firing, and quit behavior of other workers. We add the change in
firm size as a regressor to control for heterogeneity between growing and shrinking firms,
since shrinking firms are expected to have higher separation rates. The LIFO separation
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rule implies that the separation rate is higher for junior workers (i.e. γ0 is expected to
be negative).
We model χj as a correlated random-effects model (see, e.g., Wooldridge (2002))
χj = χ0j + χ1Y j,
where variable χ0j measures unobserved firm heterogeneity, and Y j is a vector of within-
firm averages of employee-observed characteristics over all time periods. We assume that
this unobserved component χ0j is distributed normally and is uncorrelated with Y j. For
Y j we use education, experience and the percentage of women working within the firm.
Ideally, we would use a sample of individuals observed from the date of labor market
entry onwards. However, for reasons discussed in our data section we focus only on people
above 25 years of age, and drop spells that are left-censored (see Lancaster (1990)).
Hence, initial experience in the first job is correlated with the random worker effect vi:
a worker with a high draw of vi can be expected to have short job spells and hence,
the initial experience in the first job started above the age of 25 is expected to be low.
To correct for this, we use the conditional likelihood method developed by Wooldridge
(2005). Moreover, we allow for specifications with and without correlation between the
unobserved worker and firm components. In the case of k mass points of the unobserved
worker component vi, we assume the following conditional distribution:
(3) P(vi = νl|Xi1, χ0i) =
exp (ηl + λlXi1 + γlχ0i)∑k
m=1 exp (ηm + λmXi1 + γlχ0i)
,
where νl, l = 1..k, are the different mass points, Xi1 is initial experience in the first job,
and χ0i is the average unobserved firm effect in the jobs of worker i; η1, λ1, and γ1 are
normalized to zero without loss of generality. For the specification without correlation
between the unobserved worker and firm component, γl = 0.
The estimation is based on the method of maximum simulated likelihood in order to
approximate the highly dimensional integral that results from taking into account firm
random effects.1 Up to ten job spells of an individual are used. We work with a discrete-
time model, since workers are observed only once a year. This also implies that short
spells are underrepresented in the duration data, since a worker has to stay at least until
the next moment of observation for a spell to be recorded.2 We cannot correct for these
problems with the data at hand.
2.2. The return to seniority
The existence of a return to seniority in wages can be tested by extending the standard
specification of the log earnings equation with the seniority index log rijt:
(4) logwijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt + β3 log rijt + β4 log njt + β5Zijt + εijt,
where logwijt is log wage. Higher-order terms in experience and tenure (and other con-
trols) are included in the vector Zijt. The coefficient β4 captures the firm-size wage effect
1In our analysis, we condition on the firm effects in order to calculate the conditional likelihood based
on (2) and (3), and integrate over the firm effects. This is an integral with the number of dimensions
equal to the number of firms. Details are provided upon request.
2Note that this problem does not affect our measurement of the seniority index rijt, since for that
purpose we only need the distribution of tenure at a particular point in time.
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documented by Brown and Medoff (1989). Substitution of log rijt as defined in (1) into
(4) yields
(5) logwijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt − β3 log qijt + (β3 + β4) log njt + β5Zijt + εijt.
The coefficient on the seniority index is thus identified separately from the coefficient
on the firm size by the variation in the log number of workers in the firm with tenure
greater than or equal to the tenure of worker i. It is therefore important to include log
firm size in the model to make sure that the estimated effect of seniority is not merely
a proxy for firm size.3
Following Topel (1991), the unobservable term can be decomposed into five orthogonal
components: a match-, a firm-, a worker-, a time-, and an idiosyncratic effect:
(6) εijt = ϕij + ψj + µi + τt + νijt.
The idiosyncratic effect νijt includes measurement error. There are all kinds of reasons for
ϕij, ψj, and µi to be correlated with Tijt (see, e.g., Topel (1991) or Altonji and Williams
(2005)). Learning and search theories imply that good worker-firm relationships tend
to survive, and bad matches are broken up, as the worker and the firm learn about
the quality of their match, leading to positive correlation between ϕij + ψj + µi and
Tijt. However, Topel (1991) showed that there are also reasons for a negative correlation
between ϕij and Tijt, since workers change jobs to get a higher wage. Hence, workers
who recently changed jobs are likely to have found a job that at least made up for the
loss of their returns to tenure. There are two existing solutions to the problem of the
endogeneity of tenure: either using within-job-spell first-differencing (FD), as applied by
Topel (1991), or adding fixed effects for every job spell (FE), as applied by Altonji and
Shakotko (1987).
The first-order effects of tenure and experience, β1 and β2, are not separately identified.
Hence, one has to revert to between-job-spell variation in order to distinguish their
effects. This problem has led to a debate between Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel
(1991), and a stream of subsequent papers. Topel (1991) establishes β1 by calculating
logwijt− (β1 + β2)Tijt and regressing this variable on initial experience X0. Altonji and
Shakotko (1987) use deviations from the mean of Tijt as an instrument for Tijt. As
discussed in Topel (1991) and Altonji and Williams (2005), there are pros and cons for
each method.4
Happily, this identification problem does not affect the estimation of the return to
seniority, β3, since the seniority index log rijt in equation (4) (or log rank log qijt in
equation (5)) is not perfectly correlated with Tijt. Hence, we can identify β3 using only
within-job-spell variation in wages. Note that Topel (1991) did not include time effects
τt in his analysis of within-job-spell variation, but instead corrected for wage growth
using an external source. Had he included time effects, then even the sum of the first-
order terms of tenure and experience, β1 + β2, would not have been identified. Altonji
3Note that a perfect application of the LIFO rule by all workers and all firms would imply that β3 is
not identified.
4Some recent studies discuss, in addition, the possible endogeneity of experience. For instance, Buchin-
sky et al. (2010) estimate a structural model with two endogenous decisions: employment and job-to-job
mobility. Dustmann and Meghir (2005), who focus on displaced workers, also take into account that
interfirm mobility might be endogenous. A detailed discussion of these studies is outside the scope of
our paper.
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and Shakotko (1987) use a time trend, making the additional assumption that their
population does not change over time with respect to experience and tenure. In our
application, we are not per se interested in either β1 or β2. Hence, for the exposition
below we include time effects, resulting in β1 + β2 dropping out of the specification.
However, in our estimation section we also report separate linear tenure and experience
effects, in order to compare them across specifications with and without accounting for
the seniority index. The web appendix of this paper discusses the identification and
estimation of these effects when time indicators are included in the wage equation.5
First-differencing (4) yields
(7) ∆ logwijt = β3∆ log rijt + β4∆ log njt + β5∆ logZijt + ∆τt + ∆νijt,
whereas taking deviations from the mean over a job spell yields
(8) log w˜ijt = β3 log r˜ijt + β4 log n˜jt + β5 log Z˜ijt + τ˜t + ν˜ijt,
where the upper tilde denotes deviations from the mean per-job spell (e.g., log w˜ijt =
logwijt− logwij, with logwij being the mean of logwijt over a job spell). Terms with β1
and β2 drop out in both specifications because we include the full set of time indicator
variables, τt.
Topel (1991) finds that νijt closely approximates a random walk plus a transitory
shock. The random walk can be interpreted as a sequence of permanent shocks.6 Topel
argues that his method is unbiased as long as job changes are not affected by these
permanent changes. He tests for this by looking at the returns to tenure and experience
based on various remaining job durations. If the permanent changes affect the estimates
of the within-spell returns, then these returns should be larger when the remaining job
duration increases. Topel finds no evidence for this hypothesis. We perform similar checks
and obtain comparable results, see the web appendix of this paper.
So far, we have assumed that the timing of the variation in seniority and the corre-
sponding variation in wages is the same. This specification is incorrect when the workers’
wages are not immediately adjusted to changes in their seniority index, e.g., because pro-
motion takes time. Suppose indeed that there is a lag in the effect of log rijt on logwijt,
for example
logwijt = β0 + β1Xijt + β2Tijt +
1
2
β3 (log rijt + log rij,t−1) +(9)
1
2
β4 (log nijt + log nij,t−1) + β5Zijt + εijt.
Assume that both logwijt and log rijt are close to a random walk. Excluding the lagged
value of rijt from the model and first-differencing the equation leads to underestimation
of the estimated coefficient β3 by a factor of two, assuming ∆ log rijt and ∆ log rij,t−1
to be uncorrelated. The same applies to β4. When using deviations from the mean, the
5In the working version of this paper we time-detrended the wages prior to the regressions. The sum
of the linear returns to T and X is then identified in the first stage, as there are no time indicators τt
in the regressions. The estimated β1 + β2 is virtually the same in both cases.
6Abowd and Card (1989), Topel and Ward (1992), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) find similar
results.
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underestimation will be smaller, due to the persistence in log rijt and log njt. Hence, the
estimates for β3 and β4 are expected to be higher when estimating these coefficients by
deviations from the mean, than by first-differencing. We include a robustness check in
which we also use lags of log seniority and log firm size. We report robust standard errors,
such that the correlation between the residuals over time implied by the autocorrelation
in the error terms does not affect the validity of the standard errors.
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) found evidence for heterogeneity in the return
to tenure between firms and between workers. We can adapt equation (4) to allow for
heterogeneity in the return to tenure between spells, and for heterogeneity in the return
to experience between individuals:
logwijt = β0 + β1iXijt + β2ijTijt + β3 log rijt + β4 log njt + β5Zijt + εijt.
In this case, the parameters β3 and β4 can be estimated by first performing within-spell
first-differences, and then taking deviations from the within-spell mean. Then, substitu-
tion of equation (6) yields
(10) ∆˜ logwijt = β3∆˜ log rijt + β4∆˜ log njt + β5∆˜Zijt + ∆˜τ t + ∆˜νijt.
3. THE DATA
For Denmark, we use the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), for
the years 1980-2001, which has been used in many previous studies, e.g., by Mortensen
(2003). IDA tracks every Danish individual between 15 and 74 years of age and contains
information of all companies with employees. The labor market status of each person
is recorded at November 30 of each year. The dataset contains a plant identifier, which
allows the construction of the total workforce of a plant, and hence of the firm as a whole.
We use information on the hourly gross earnings, education, age of individuals, and on
the location and industry of the plant at which they work at the start of a job, as well
as on firm employment size. Industry is defined as the industry employing the largest
share of the firm’s workforce. Firm size is defined as the number of individuals holding
a primary job in that firm and earning a positive wage.7 The tenure of workers hired
since 1980 can be calculated directly from the IDA. The tenure of workers hired between
1964-1980 can be calculated from a second dataset on contributions to a pension plan.
Job spells starting before 1964 are discarded.
For Portugal, we use Quadros de Pessoal, for 1986-2009, which has also been frequently
used in earlier research, e.g., by Cabral and Mata (2003). The dataset is based on a com-
pulsory survey of firms, establishments and all of their workers. The available information
is similar to that for Denmark, except that workers’ tenure is directly reported. Industry
is defined as the industry with the highest sales share of the firm or, when allocation by
sales is impossible, the highest employment share. We use all full-time employees in their
main job and working for a firm located in Portugal’s mainland. Wages are measured
with high accuracy.
For both countries, we use data for all private-sector jobs, except for agriculture, fishing
and mining. Potential experience is the worker’s age minus the years of schooling minus
7We perform a robustness check using the number of registered full-time-equivalent units, instead of
this definition. The reported analysis in this paper discards the few firms where the correlation between
the two firm-size measures is low, but none of the results are affected if using all firms.
RETURNS TO TENURE OR SENIORITY? 9
6.8 We first calculate the seniority variable log rijt for all workers in all firms. Furthermore,
we calculate seniority indices separately for gender and education subgroups. These are
defined as an individual’s tenure rank within the tenure distribution in the subgroups of
male and female employees respectively, as well as in the subgroups of lower and higher
educated workers. We define higher educated workers as those workers with more than
12 years of education. In addition to the seniority measures computed at the firm or firm
subgroup-level, we are also able to retrieve establishment tenure and size, which allows
us to compute establishment-level seniority for every employee.9
For the duration analysis, we use all employment spells of men over 25 years of age. By
leaving out younger individuals from the data, we eliminate those who could still be in
education, and might have part-time jobs while at school. We exclude women from the
duration analysis since they are more likely to leave their job for reasons unrelated to
the LIFO rule (in particular, child bearing). Observations for individuals above 55 years
of age are also excluded, since for this group retirement starts disrupting the application
of the LIFO rule; spells started before the age of 55 and finished afterwards are taken
as right-censored. Including both unobserved firm and worker effects in the non-linear
MPH model is a highly computational-intensive task. Hence, we use only a 5 percent
random sample of the observed individuals. Furthermore, we exclude all firms that exist
in the data for less than ten years or have fewer than ten employees at any point of time.
As discussed in Section 2, the unobserved firm effect is not well identified for smaller
firms, leading to biases. Checking the sensitivity of our results to changes in all these
thresholds revealed that they matter little for our results.10
For the wage analysis, we report estimates using all observations for male employees
over 25 years old, for all the firms in our datasets; for each year, we eliminate all obser-
vations corresponding to wages lower than the relevant minimum wage, and the upper
percentile of the wage distribution.
Summary statistics for the two countries, for the larger sample used in the wage re-
gressions, are presented in Table I. We present statistics for the time-pooled data, and
for year 2000 separately. While some statistics (such as the mean age or mean potential
work experience) are similar in both countries, there are also several striking differences.
The education level in Denmark is five years higher than that in Portugal. Furthermore,
Danes stay on average almost three and a half years less at a firm than do their Por-
tuguese counterparts. The average firm size in Portugal is about half of that in Denmark.
Finally, Danes earn on average almost five times as much as the Portuguese.
8For Denmark, the data allow us to construct actual experience as well. Using actual rather than po-
tential experience does not make a difference for the coefficients on seniority. For the sake of consistency,
we report results using potential experience for both countries.
9In both countries, we know the firm, but not the establishment, for the unobserved part of ongoing
spells at the start of our data observation windows. We assume that such workers have always been
attached to their first establishment observed in the data. Hence, firm tenure is better measured than
establishment tenure for these individuals.
10For Portugal, tenure is reported in months. We use this information in the estimation. For the rest,
the modeling is the same for both countries.
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TABLE I
Descriptive statistics for Denmark and Portugal
DK 1980-2001 DK 2000 PT 1986-2009 PT 2000
Variable
Age 40·90 41·51 40·51 40·51
(10·54) (10·65) (10·49) (10·52)
Years of education 12·35 12·87 6·86 6·85
(3·14) (2·81) (3·73) (3·63)
Tenure 6·15 5·77 9·30 9·26
(6·04) (6·08) (9·04) (9·28)
Experience 22·93 23·41 24·04 24·05
(11·14) (10·73) (10·81) (10·85)
Log seniority 0·70 0·66 0·86 0·86
(0·75) (0·75) (0·85) (0·84)
Log firm size 4·70 4·77 4·14 4·05
(2·33) (2·35) (2·11) (2·14)
Log wage 3·15 3·20 1·52 1·61
(0·30) (0·32) (0·53) (0·52)
Observations 12,634,236 626,867 15,371,019 725,729
Workers 1,412,646 626,867 2,931,323 725,729
Firms 221,807 60,236 458,888 124,621
Spells 3,456,711 626,867 4,662,627 725,729
Standard deviations of variables appear in parentheses under their means.
Wages are expressed in euro and deflated to year-2000 prices. Seniority is
computed at firm-level.
4. RESULTS
4.1. The LIFO separation rule
Table II reports the estimation results for the MPH model described in Section 2.1. We
report results for specifications with up to 3 mass point for the worker random effects,
with and without correlation between the worker and the firm effect (γl = 0 and γl 6= 0
respectively; see equation (3)), and a specification extended with second order effects
for seniority index and the change in log firm size. In the last column, we replicate our
preferred specification for establishments rather than firms.
For both countries and for all specifications, the effect of the seniority index log rijt
on the hazard rate is negative, in line with the LIFO hypothesis. More than two mass
points for the worker random effects do not provide a substantial improvement to the
fit of the model and do not change the other coefficients much. In particular, the coef-
ficient on log rijt is hardly affected. This coefficient is similarly unchanged by allowing
for correlation between the unobserved worker- and firm effects. If we compute job exit
odds ratios, based on the reported coefficients for the specification with 3 mass points
random worker effect and correlated unobserved worker and firm effects, a 10% increase
in the seniority of a new entrant in the firm (evaluated at the sample mean of the other
observables and unobservables) reduces the hazard rate by about 1.6% in Denmark and
3.4% in Portugal.
Unlike seniority, the coefficients on the firm averages for observed variables change
in magnitude when allowing for correlation between the unobserved effects. Workers in
growing firms have a smaller probability of leaving the firm than do workers in declining
firms. The same applies to firms with a relatively large share of women, higher educated
workers, and experienced workers. Unobserved worker effects are more important for
explaining the pattern of job separation than are unobserved firm effects, although the
estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution for workers are imprecise. The
correlation between the worker and firm effects is negative. Second order terms for the
seniority index are insignificant. Finally, replicating the analysis for establishments rather
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TABLE II
Job exit hazard on firm or establishment seniority, reported for males
Firms Establishments
Specification Without correlation With correlation With correlation
Mass points 1 2 3 2 3 3 3
Denmark
log rijt −0·166 −0·174 −0·174 −0·169 −0·178 −0·270 −0·109
(0·035) (0·042) (0·042) (0·051) (0·050) (0·050) (0·025)
(log rijt)
2 0·026
(0·023)
∆ lognjt −0·009 −0·008 −0·008 −0·007 −0·007 0·077 8·e-4
(0·002) (0·002) (0·002) (0·002) (0·002) (0·007) (0·001)
(∆ lognjt)
2 −0·001
(0·e-4)
Correlated random-effects terms
Firm averages
Women −0·248 −0·380 −0·379 −0·621 −0·585 −0·594 −0·343
(0·073) (0·086) (0·087) (0·116) (0·118) (0·113) (0·094)
Education −0·110 −0·137 −0·137 −0·178 −0·163 −0·174 −0·116
(0·012) (0·015) (0·015) (0·020) (0·020) (0·015) (0·016)
Experience −0·024 −0·028 −0·028 −0·041 −0·040 −0·044 −0·035
(0·004) (0·005) (0·005) (0·006) (0·007) (0·005) (0·005)
Std. Dev. of χ 0·252 0·e-4 0·e-4 1·400 1·607 1·598 0·e-4
(0·096) (0·123) (0·123) (0·086) (0·094) (0·036) (0·236)
Std. Dev. of v 0 0·966 0·958 2·349 4·656 2·388 0·819
(·) (0·051) (0·049) (0·095) (82·253) (23·786) (0·040)
Corr. of v with χ 0 0 0 −0·719 −0·726 −0·716 0·000
(·) (·) (·) (0·005) (0·485) (1·970) (0·283)
Mean log likelihood −1·852 −1·845 −1·845 −1·815 −1·810 −1·808 −1·725
Observations 107,245 90,982
Firms 1,999 2,345
Individuals 19,591 16,368
Portugal
log rijt −0·243 −0·312 −0·312 −0·348 −0·349 −0·472 −0·372
(0·073) (0·082) (0·011) (0·090) (0·011) (0·175) (0·113)
(log rijt)
2 0·052
(0·058)
∆ lognjt −0·306 −0·298 −0·302 −0·302 −0·297 −0·310 −0·157
(0·056) (0·057) (0·057) (0·058) (0·002) (0·093) (0·074)
(∆ lognjt)
2 0·002
(0·093)
Correlated random-effects terms
Firm averages
Women −0·204 −0·298 −0·298 −0·371 −0·356 −0·373 −0·217
(0·166) (0·187) (0·191) (0·208) (0·209) (0·209) (0·276)
Education −0·042 −0·041 −0·041 −0·036 −0·036 −0·042 −0·047
(0·022) (0·026) (0·026) (0·029) (0·030) (0·029) (0·037)
Experience −0·032 −0·036 −0·038 −0·049 −0·036 −0·040 −0·057
(0·008) (0·010) (0·010) (0·011) (0·011) (0·011) (0·014)
Std. Dev. of χ 0·001 0·001 0·001 0·920 0·922 0·908 0·781
(0·230) (0·267) (0·272) (0·179) (0·188) (0·187) (0·322)
Std. Dev. of v 0 4·010 1·328 3·147 2·351 2·467 7·295
(·) (1·265) (0·675) (42·960) (4·610) (6·637) (10·982)
Corr. of v with χ 0 0 0 −0·663 −0·656 −0·656 −0·630
(·) (·) (·) (0·024) (0·031) (0·036) (0·025)
Mean log likelihood −1·170 −1·167 −1·167 −1·162 −1·162 −1·162 −1·188
Observations 30,674 16,308
Firms 941 692
Individuals 6,209 2,820
The estimation also controls for years of education, initial experience (up to a quartic term), region and
industry indicators. The last column uses seniority, tenure, employment size, and employee averages computed
at establishment- rather than at firm-level. The firms and establishments in the estimation sample are selected
according to the same rule (see text), from their respective universes in the data. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 1.— Baseline hazards and the contributions of average seniority to the hazard
for different levels of the tenure. The baseline hazards are for the model with three
different mass points.
than firms does not change in any way our conclusions.
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of tenure and seniority on the hazard rate. The vertical
axis represents the change in the index of the hazard logistic function (see equation (2)).
The shaded area represents the 95 percent confidence bands for the baseline hazards
ψTijt , while the dashed lines are the 1
st, 5th and respectively 9th deciles of the seniority
contribution. We find negative duration dependence for both countries, although it is
much stronger for Portugal than for Denmark. This result is comparable to other studies
(e.g. Topel and Ward (1992) or Altonji, Smith and Vidangos (2013)). The impact of
seniority is larger for longer tenure. For Denmark, the difference in the logistic function
contribution to the hazard rate between the 10th and the 90th percentile of the seniority
distribution measured at eight years of tenure is 0.15. This difference is about the same
magnitude as the effect of the negative duration dependence. For Portugal, the effect is
about twice as large. However, the difference in the effect of negative duration dependence
between the two countries is much larger: such that in Portugal the effect of negative
duration dependence dominates the effect of seniority.
4.2. The return to seniority
Following a large empirical literature on wage dynamics, we start by checking the
characteristics of the dynamic process of νijt (see equation (6)). For both countries,
the covariance of ∆νijt with its first lag is substantial and the covariance with higher
lags is negligible. The process is therefore well approximated by an MA(1), a mixture
of permanent and transitory shocks. The standard deviation of the permanent shocks
is 0.10 for Denmark and 0.12 for Portugal.11 These findings are of the same order of
magnitude as those reported by Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward (1992) for
11See our web appendix for the results.
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TABLE III
Log wage regressions on firm seniority, reported for males
OLS Topel Altonji and Shakotko Topel with spell fixed effects
I II I II I II I II
Denmark
log rijt 0·036 0·008 0·009 0·010
(2·e-4) (3·e-4) (5·e-4) (4·e-4)
lognjt 0·016 0·016 0·017 0·012 0·031 0·026 0·016 0·009
(0·e-4) (0·e-4) (2·e-4) (3·e-4) (3·e-4) (5·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4)
Xijt −0·004 −0·004 0·048 0·048 0·032 0·032 0·028 0·028
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (4·e-4) (3·e-4) (3·e-4) (3·e-4) (0·004)
Tijt 0·017 0·007 −0·006 −0·008 0·007 0·004 0·001 −0·002
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (9·e-4) (9·e-4) (1·e-4) (2·e-4) (0·005) (0·006)
T 2ijt −0·174 −0·100 0·118 0·136 −0·025 −0·008 0·143 0·159
(0·003) (0·003) (0·003) (0·003) (0·002) (0·003) (0·004) (0·004)
T 3ijt 0·074 0·046 −0·062 −0·070 0·008 0·001 −0·073 −0·080
(0·001) (0·001) (0·001) (0·001) (0·001) (0·001) (0·002) (0·002)
T 4ijt −0·010 −0·006 0·010 0·011 −3·e-4 4·e-4 0·011 0·012
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (3·e-4) (3·e-4) (2·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (4·e-4)
R2 0·068 0·071 0·031 0·031 0·211 0·221 0·023 0·023
Observations 12,275,995 8,597,167 12,275,995 8,597,167
Portugal
log rijt 0·033 0·015 0·022 0·018
(2·e-4) (4·e-4) (5·e-4) (7·e-4)
lognjt 0·090 0·088 0·024 0·014 0·056 0·043 0·018 0·006
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (3·e-4) (4·e-4) (4·e-4) (5·e-4) (5·e-4) (7·e-4)
Xijt −0·141 −0·142 0·069 0·069 0·061 0·059 0·082 0·081
(4·e-4) (4·e-4) (7·e-4) (4·e-5) (6·e-4) (6·e-4) (5·e-5) (5·e-5)
Tijt 0·036 0·031 0·017 0·015 0·017 0·015 0·016 0·016
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (0·001) (0·001) (1·e-4) (2·e-4) (0·016) (0·032)
T 2ijt −0·250 −0·213 −0·078 −0·061 −0·052 −0·038 −0·031 −0·021
(0·001) (0·001) (0·002) (0·002) (0·002) (0·002) (0·007) (0·007)
T 3ijt 0·074 0·062 0·025 0·019 0·013 0·008 0·033 0·029
(5·e-4) (5·e-4) (9·e-4) (9·e-4) (6·e-4) (6·e-4) (0·001) (0·001)
T 4ijt −0·007 −0·006 −0·003 −0·002 −0·001 −5·e-4 −0·004 −0·003
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (1·e-4) (1·e-4) (1·e-4) (1·e-4) (2·e-4) (2·e-4)
R2 0·239 0·240 0·033 0·033 0·507 0·509 0·004 0·004
Observations 15,371,019 9,191,177 15,371,019 9,191,177
The dependent variable is the log real hourly wage. All regressions also control for further potential expe-
rience terms up to a quartic, for up to a quartic in years of education, and for time, region and industry
indicators. Reported coefficients for higher order polynomials in tenure are multiplied by corresponding
powers of 10. For the last two columns, we report tenure effects averaged over job spells, assuming ho-
mogenous returns to experience (see the discussion in our web appendix). Standard errors in parentheses.
the United States.
Table III reports our main estimates for the return to seniority on wages of male
workers. As described in Section 2.2, our regressions control for up to a quartic term in
tenure and experience, and for log firm size. Furthermore, we include up to a quartic in
education years, and dummy variables for industry, region and calendar time. We present
two specifications, with and without the seniority index log rijt. All estimated coefficients
for the seniority index log rijt are positive and statistically highly significant.
The OLS results stand out in their magnitude for the coefficient on log rijt. This is the
only estimation method that also applies between-job-spell variation for the estimation of
the return to seniority. As for our two main methods, the coefficients are somewhat larger
forAltonji and Shakotko (1987)’s method (job-spell fixed effects) than for Topel (1991)’s
(job-spell first-differences). This confirms our expectation, since Altonji and Shakotko’s
estimation procedure implicitly allows for a lagged effect of log rijt on logwijt, see the
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discussion on equation (9). According to these methods, the effect of log rijt is twice
as high in the Portuguese data. Given a 10% increase in a worker’s seniority level, the
estimated impact on his wage is about 0.15 to 0.20% if he is employed in Portugal, and
half this range if he is employed in Denmark. The final columns report estimates for
the method that allows for heterogeneity in the returns to experience and tenure, as in
equation (10). For both countries, the estimated returns to seniority are hardly affected
by applying this method. The reported coefficients for tenure terms (identified and es-
timated assuming homogenous linear returns to experience; see the detailed discussion
in our web appendix) are averages over job spells; the linear job-spell-averaged tenure
coefficients are not statistically significant, given very little variation left in the data.
Comparing for each specification of Table III the estimation results with and without
seniority, we note that including seniority reduces the coefficients for log firm size and for
the tenure terms by 5− 65% (except for the effect of tenure in Denmark, which is small
anyway). The coefficients for experience are hardly affected by the inclusion of seniority.
This suggests that the effects of tenure and firm size on wages are at least partly proxies
for the effect of seniority.
Could measurement error in tenure explain our results? Measurement error in tenure
is a general problem in the research on the wage returns to tenure. Apart from reporting
errors, a main source of measurement error is the exact definition of a worker’s employer.
Some job changes might either be classified as “between firms”, justifying the tenure clock
being set back to zero, or as “within the firm”, which does not affect the tenure clock. In
general, measurement error reduces the estimated returns to tenure, while it may lead to
an overestimation of the returns to other variables which are correlated with tenure, such
as experience. But what happens if both seniority and tenure are included in the same
regression, as we do here? We expect the measurement error in seniority to be larger
than the measurement error of tenure, as misclassification of the years of tenure of even
a single worker can affect the measurement of seniority of all his co-workers. The same
is true for the log firm size. Moreover, the empirically relevant seniority index might
not be based on the total workforce of the firm, but on co-worker subgroups. Therefore,
seniority is not likely to pick up part of the returns to tenure. The other way around
is much more likely: part of the estimated effect of tenure and log firm size might be a
proxy for measurement error in the seniority variable, and the actual effect of seniority
on wages can be expected to be larger than estimated here.12
Table IV documents the impact of seniority and cumulated tenure on the within-
job wage changes, for different years of tenure. The wage return to tenure is highest
in Portugal: after ten years of tenure, it is 12-16%, depending on whether Topel’s or
Altonji and Shakotko’s method is applied. The equivalent numbers for Denmark are
only 0.5-4.5%. Using the Topel method that allows for spell fixed effects gives statistically
insignificant job-spell-averaged tenure estimates for Denmark, and borderline significant
for Portugal. This is not unexpected, since the estimated variances for the job-spell-
averaged linear tenure terms in the last two columns of Table III were already large.
Conditional on 10 years of tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th
12In principle, the misclassification problem here– who is the relevant employer, and thus which is
the relevant seniority hierarchy– can be addressed by adapting the approach used by Keane and Sauer
(2009), who model measurement error in the reported individual employment status, in the context of
a dynamic labour supply model (see their Section 2.2, equation (6)). Further investigation of this issue
is, however, beyond the scope of our current paper.
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TABLE IV
Effect of firm seniority on log wages of males, by cumulated years of tenure
Altonji and Topel with
Tenure Topel Shakotko spell fixed effects
(in years) Tenure Seniority Tenure Seniority Tenure Seniority
D1 D5 D9 D1 D5 D9 D1 D5 D9
Denmark
2 −0·009 4·e-4 0·002 0·005 0·010 5·e-4 0·002 0·005 0·005 5·e-4 0·002 0·006
(0·002) (1·e-5) (1·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (3·e-5) (1·e-4) (3·e-4) (0·013) (2·e-5) (1·e-4) (2·e-4)
5 −0·009 0·002 0·005 0·010 0·025 0·003 0·006 0·012 0·030 0·003 0·007 0·013
(0·005) (1·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (0·001) (1·e-4) (3·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·032) (1·e-4) (3·e-4) (5·e-4)
10 0·005 0·004 0·009 0·015 0·045 0·005 0·010 0·018 0·089 0·006 0·011 0·020
(0·009) (2·e-4) (3·e-4) (6·e-4) (0·003) (3·e-4) (5·e-4) (0·001) (0·064) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (8·e-4)
15 0·015 0·006 0·012 0·019 0·063 0·007 0·014 0·023 0·146 0·008 0·015 0·025
(0·014) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (8·e-4) (0·008) (4·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·001) (0·097) (3·e-4) (6·e-4) (0·001)
20 0·011 0·008 0·014 0·023 0·082 0·010 0·017 0·028 0·185 0·009 0·017 0·028
(0·023) (3·e-4) (5·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·016) (5·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·002) (0·133) (4·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·001)
Portugal
2 0·033 0 0·004 0·013 0·041 0 0·006 0·019 0·029 0 0·005 0·016
(0·003) (0·e-4) (1·e-4) (4·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·e-4) (1·e-4) (4·e-4) (0·013) (0·e-4) (3·e-4) (0·001)
5 0·071 0·001 0·008 0·021 0·092 0·002 0·011 0·030 0·058 0·002 0·009 0·025
(0·007) (4·e-5) (2·e-4) (6·e-4) (9·e-4) (4·e-5) (3·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·031) (1·e-4) (5·e-4) (0·002)
10 0·117 0·004 0·012 0·027 0·163 0·005 0·017 0·039 0·080 0·004 0·015 0·033
(0·014) (1·e-4) (3·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·002) (1·e-4) (4·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·063) (3·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·002)
15 0·151 0·005 0·014 0·031 0·223 0·008 0·021 0·045 0·084 0·006 0·017 0·038
(0·022) (1·e-4) (4·e-4) (8·e-4) (0·005) (2·e-4) (4·e-4) (0·001) (0·095) (4·e-4) (0·001) (0·002)
20 0·180 0·008 0·018 0·036 0·281 0·011 0·026 0·052 0·081 0·010 0·022 0·044
(0·030) (2·e-4) (5·e-4) (0·001) (0·009) (3·e-4) (6·e-4) (0·001) (0·130) (6·e-4) (0·001) (0·003)
All effects are based on the estimates reported in Table III. The deciles of seniority are calculated conditional on tenure.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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percentiles in the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 2.3-
3.4 in Portugal. Taking those numbers at face value, this implies that the effect of ten
years of tenure on wages is larger than the effect of a shift in the seniority distribution
from the 10th to the 90th percentile. For shorter tenures, the effect of seniority is smaller,
as there is less variation in seniority at lower tenure (lower tenures are more likely to
come from junior workers, while for higher tenures the degree of seniority depends on
the growth of the firm after the worker has been hired).
Table V reports a number of robustness checks. The first consists of including a full
second-order polynomial of log rijt and log njt. No consistent conclusion can be drawn
from these higher-order effects across the two countries or across estimation methods.
Although the first-order effect at zero seniority and small firm size becomes negative in
some cases,13 the effect of seniority remains positive in the sample mean of log rijt and
log njt. Hence, including second order terms does not change our conclusions.
For the second robustness check, we include two lags of log rijt and log njt. The total
impact of log rijt and its lags exceeds the impact of the unlagged seniority index in the
case of Topel’s method, for Portugal. This is also the country where there is a substantial
difference between the results for Topel’s and Altonji and Shakotko’s method in Table
III. This squares well with our prior observation that Altonji and Shakotko’s method
picks up lagged effects better (see the discussion of equation (9)). We conclude that
although– and as expected– the presence of lagged effects matters to some extent in
terms of magnitude differences between the estimates obtained via our two methods,
once again the main implication is very robust.
The third robustness check deletes the upper 25 percent of the changes in log qijt.
This exercise tests whether some large changes in log qijt drive our results. For Denmark,
eliminating the upper 25 percent of the variation in log qijt takes out the observations
that contribute most to identification, reducing the significance of the coefficient on log
seniority and even rendering it statistically insignificant for one estimation method. For
Portugal, the impact is less pronounced, though there is a large change in the seniority
magnitude for the Topel using spell fixed effects, compared to Table III. Large changes
in log qijt are thus important for identification and estimation of the seniority effect– and
we notice that particularly for the Danish data. Hence, it is crucial to work with the type
of data we use: exhaustive both in terms of the panel and the cross-sectional dimensions.
Since there is no a priori reason why we should prefer a firm-level to an establishment-
level analysis, see Brown and Medoff (1989), our final robustness check looks at the im-
pact of the worker seniority within establishments. Results obtained with all of our three
estimation methods, and for both countries, reveal the same qualitative implications as
the estimates obtained for the firms. There are only some quantitative differences for
Denmark, relative to the firm-level seniority estimates in Table III: the magnitude of the
seniority estimate is considerably larger at the establishment level when estimated with
Altonji and Shakotko’s method, and respectively smaller if estimated with the method
of Topel with fixed spell effects.
4.2.1. Returns to seniority within gender and education subgroups
The LIFO layoff rule is unlikely to apply for the workforce as a whole. Instead, one
would expect the firm to apply separate layoff orders for different subgroups of its work-
13By construction, the smallest log firm size is equal to zero. Hence, the first-order effect of seniority
measures the marginal effect of seniority at the lowest seniority and the lowest firm size.
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TABLE V
Robustness log wage regressions on firm or establishment seniority, reported for males
Topel Altonji and Shakotko Topel with spell fixed effects
Poly- Lag Upper Establish- Poly- Lag Upper Establish- Poly- Lag Upper Establish-
nomial structure 25% deleted ments nomial structure 25% deleted ments nomial structure 25% deleted ments
Denmark
log rijt −0·013 0·017 0·037 0·008 −0·004 0·025 4·e-4 0·022 0·015 0·013 0·001 0·002
(5·e-4) (4·e-4) (9·e-4) (2·e-4) (8·e-4) (0·001) (5·e-4) (3·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·002) (5·e-4) (3·e-4)
(log rijt)
2 −6·e-4 0·001 0·003
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (2·e-4)
log rij,t−1 0·004 0·009 0·002
(5·e-4) (0·001) (7·e-4)
log rij,t−2 0·001 −0·031 0·003
(4·e-4) (0·002) (6·e-4)
lognjt 0·021 0·006 −0·016 0·158 0·040 0·032 0·017 0·030 0·002 0·007 0·018 0·017
(5·e-4) (4·e-4) (9·e-4) (2·e-4) (8·e-4) (0·001) (3·e-4) (3·e-4) (7·e-4) (5·e-4) (0·001) (2·e-4)
(lognjt)
2 −0·002 −0·002 0·002
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (1·e-4)
log rijt × lognjt 0·006 0·002 −0·004
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (2·e-4)
lognj,t−1 0·002 0·025 −6·e-4
(4·e-4) (9·e-4) (6·e-4)
lognj,t−2 0·003 −0·001 −0·002
(4·e-4) (1·e-4) (5·e-4)
R2 0·032 0·046 0·034 0·030 0·230 0·156 0·233 0·232 0·023 0·034 0·025 0·023
Observations 8,597,167 4,985,101 5,568,885 8,573,782 12,275,995 6,459,830 10,129,966 12,268,564 10,129,966 4,985,101 6,450,277 8,573,782
Portugal
log rijt 0·012 0·015 0·015 0·015 0·013 0·050 0·021 0·021 −0·002 0·012 0·030 0·015
(8·e-4) (8·e-4) (0·002) (4·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·003) (5·e-4) (5·e-4) (0·001) (0·001) (0·002) (7·e-4)
(log rijt)
2 −0·003 −0·0002 −0·008
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (3·e-4)
log rij,t−1 0·007 −0·015 0·004
(8·e-4) (0·003) (0·001)
log rij,t−2 −0·001 −0·010 −0·001
(8·e-4) (0·002) (0·001)
lognjt 0·015 0·014 0·015 0·012 0·046 0·038 0·044 0·038 0·012 0·012 −0·005 0·007
(8·e-4) (7·e-4) (0·002) (4·e-4) (9·e-4) (0·003) (5·e-4) (4·e-4) (0·001) (0·001) (0·003) (7·e-4)
(lognjt)
2 −4·e-4 −5·e-4 −0·003
(1·e-4) (1·e-4) (2·e-4)
rijt × njt 0·003 0·002 0·013
(2·e-4) (2·e-4) (4·e-4)
lognj,t−1 0·001 0·024 6·e-4
(8·e-4) (0·002) (0·001)
lognj,t−2 0·009 −2·e-4 0·008
(8·e-4) (0·002) (0·001)
R2 0·033 0·032 0·035 0·033 0·509 0·526 0·509 0·503 0·005 0·011 0·008 0·004
Observations 9,191,177 3,844,432 6,080,043 8,727,604 15,371,019 5,940,218 15,338,663 15,737,962 9,191,177 3,844,432 6,893,442 8,727,604
The dependent variable is the log real hourly wage. All regressions also control for tenure, potential experience and years of education up to a quartic, and time,
region and industry indicators. Standard errors in parentheses.
18 BUHAI, PORTELA, TEULINGS, AND VAN VUUREN
TABLE VI
Log wage regressions on firm subgroup-specific seniority, reported for males
High education Low education Males Females
Topel Altonji and Topel Altonji and Topel Altonji and Topel Altonji and
Shakotko Shakotko Shakotko Shakotko
Denmark
log rijt 0·014 0·019 0·004 −0·004 0·009 0·010 0·009 0·005
(4·e-4) (6·e-4) (5·e-4) (6·e-4) (3·e-4) (5·e-4) (4·e-4) (6·e-4)
lognjt 0·006 0·020 0·012 0·020 0·011 0·024 5·e-4 0·015
(3·e-4) (6·e-4) (5·e-4) (7·e-4) (3·e-4) (4·e-4) (4·e-4) (6·e-4)
Xijt 0·047 0·043 0·032 0·005 0·048 0·031 0·037 0·018
(5·e-4) (4·e-4) (0·001) (0·001) (4·e-4) (3·e-4) (6·e-4) (0·001)
Tijt −0·013 0·003 −0·002 0·004 −0·008 0·004 0·002 0·005
(0·001) (2·e-4) (0·003) (3·e-4) (9·e-4) (2·e-4) (0·001) (3·e-4)
R2 0·035 0·255 0·025 0·093 0·031 0·225 0·032 0·204
Observations 5,948,533 8,443,390 2,631,458 3,814,024 8,597,167 12,275,995 4,368,909 6,288,217
Portugal
log rijt 0·023 −0·001 0·014 0·017 0·014 0·013 0·008 0·002
(0·002) (0·003) (4·e-4) (6·e-4) (4·e-4) (5·e-4) (4·e-4) (6·e-4)
lognjt 0·009 0·040 0·012 0·042 0·012 0·046 0·011 0·048
(0·002) (0·002) (4·e-4) (7·e-4) (4·e-4) (5·e-4) (5·e-4) (5·e-4)
Xijt 0·083 0·077 0·057 0·054 0·076 0·059 0·060 0·059
(0·002) (0·002) (9·e-4) (7·e-4) (7·e-4) (7·e-4) (7·e-4) (6·e-4)
Tijt 0·032 0·040 0·006 0·013 0·007 0·016 0·013 0·019
(0·005) (9·e-4) (0·002) (2·e-4) (0·002) (2·e-4) (0·002) (2·e-4)
R2 0·067 0·267 0·030 0·425 0·033 0·508 0·034 0·033
Observations 643,477 1,084,463 8,745,904 14,286,518 9,400,472 15,371,019 6,963,628 14,286,518
The dependent variable is the log real hourly wage. Seniority and employment size are computed for each of
the gender or education subgroup of co-workers within firms. For the education subgroups we report estimates
only for males. All regressions also control for further tenure and potential experience terms up to a quartic,
up to a quartic in years of education, and time, region and industry indicators. Standard errors in parentheses.
force. For example, a construction firm is unlikely to fire its secretaries if it has an excess
supply of bricklayers, whatever the difference in seniority at the firm level between these
two types of workers. One can therefore expect the theory to work better when using
separate seniority indices for subgroups of the workforce. Data limitations prohibit us
to consistently classify workers according to their occupation, over the whole time and
cross-sectional dimensions of our datasets. Moreover, doing so would be problematic,
because the promotions that accompany an increase in seniority are likely to change the
occupation title of the job, thereby missing part of what is a genuine return to senior-
ity. Hence, we have to revert to broad demographic groups, like males versus females or
higher- versus lower-educated workers. For the same reason as in the case of seniority
computed at the entire firm level, we report results using only male observations for the
subgroups of low- and high-educated workers.
The estimates are reported in Table VI. The size variable, log njt, is in this table the
size of the relevant seniority subgroup. The results for the seniority subgroup of men
are similar to the results in Table III. Seniority has a larger impact for men than for
women, although the difference is small. The effect of seniority is larger for high- than
for low-educated workers, except for Portugal, when using the method of Altonji and
Shakotko, where the result is statistically insignificant.14 These results are consistent
14The number of observations for high educated workers is relatively low in Portugal and taking
within-job-spell deviations from means removes most of the variation in the data, necessary to identify
the seniority effect. Therefore, this result is not very robust. We find a much larger impact if we do
robustness checks in a similar way as presented in Table V.
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with the fact that high-educated workers have steeper wage-tenure profiles than their
low-educated peers. At the same time, these results lend support to the idea that the
relevant seniority index is not defined for the firm as a whole, but for various co-worker
subgroups within the firm.
5. CONCLUSION
A dynamic version of Kuhn (1988)’s and Kuhn and Robert (1989)’s model of layoff
ordering suggests that firms and their workers are induced to agree on the firm applying
a LIFO rule for its layoffs, firing junior workers with short tenure prior to senior workers
with long tenure. Senior workers can use this insulation from the direct threat of being
laid off to demand higher wages. This paper provides empirical evidence for these effects.
We have shown first that, other things equal, senior workers face a smaller job separa-
tion hazard, and second, that there exists a return to seniority in wages, both in Denmark
and in Portugal. A 10% increase in the seniority of a new entrant in the firm reduces the
hazard of separation by approximately 1.6% in Denmark and 3.4% in Portugal. These
results hardly vary with the number of mass points for worker heterogeneity, whether or
not one allows for correlation between the worker and firm unobservables, when using
a more flexible specification of seniority, or whether LIFO is tested at establishment-
rather than at firm-level. The difference in the contribution to the hazard rates between
the 10th and the 90th percentile of the seniority distribution, conditional on ten years
of tenure, has the same magnitude as the effect of the negative duration dependence
in Denmark. This effect is twice as large, but dominated by the effect of the negative
duration dependence in Portugal.
Similarly, we have shown that a 10% increase in seniority raises wages by up to 0.1% in
Denmark and up to 0.2% in Portugal. The return to seniority in wages is therefore small,
but statistically highly significant. Again, these results are stable across various estima-
tion methods, and do not change much whether the estimation is performed at firm- or
at establishment-level. Conditional on ten years of tenure, the wage differential between
the 10th and the 90th percentile of the seniority distribution increases workers’ wages by
up to 1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 3.4 percentage points in Portugal. The ef-
fects are larger for men than for women, and for higher-educated than for lower-educated
employees. Likely, these effects are lower bounds for the true effects, since seniority is
measured less precisely than are firm size and tenure, given that the measurement error
in the latter two variables automatically feeds into the seniority variable.
Denmark is known for its “flexicurity”model. Its labor market is more flexible than that
of Portugal, where insider interests are protected by extensive employment protection
legislation. One would thus expect seniority to be more important in the latter country.
The estimation results confirm this idea. We have established the existence of a LIFO
rule and a return to seniority for Denmark and for Portugal. Whether these phenomena
exist in other countries– in particular, in the United States– remains an open question.
Given the fact that the labour market institutions in the United States are more akin to
those in Denmark than those in Portugal, one would expect small effects for the United
States.
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